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Abstract In addition to longer-term engagement in med-
itation, the past years have seen an increasing interest in
the impact of single bouts of meditation on cognition.
In this hypothesis and theory article, we adopt the dis-
tinction between focused-attention meditation (FAM)
and open-monitoring meditation (OMM) and argue that
these different types of meditation have different, to
some degree, opposite impact on cognitive processes.
We discuss evidence suggesting that single bouts of
FAM and OMM are sufficient to bias cognitive control
styles towards more versus less top-down control, re-
spectively. We conclude that all meditation techniques
are not equal and that successful meditation-based inter-
vention requires the theoretically guided selection of the
best-suited technique.
Keywords Cognitive control . Focused-attentionmeditation .
Open-monitoringmeditation .Decisionmaking .Persistence .
Flexibility
Introduction
Whilemeditation is often viewed and employed as a technique to
reduce stress (Chiesa and Seretti 2009), its potential to increase
cognitive abilities has been emphasized from its beginnings (e.g.,
Luk 1994). For instance, some Buddhist meditation techniques
explicitly and intentionally target the training and improvement
of concentration (manasikara) and insight (vipassanā; see
Santucci 1979), which tap into attentional control and higher-
order cognition that according to Lutz et al. (2008) are system-
atically affected and improved by meditation. These possible
links to cognitive improvement have attracted the attention of
researchers, who indeed found evidence that active meditators
show improved performance in a whole range of cognitive tasks.
In particular, engaging in focused-attention meditation (FAM;
which typically calls for sustaining selective attention moment-
by-moment on a specific object with a fairly narrow focus: Lutz
et al. 2015), open-monitoringmeditation (OMM;which typically
calls for the attentive monitoring of anything that occurs in ex-
perience without focusing on any explicit object), and loving-
kindness or compassion meditation has been found to be associ-
ated with specific effects on attentional selection, conflict moni-
toring, and creativity-related tasks (Lippelt et al. 2014). However,
active meditators can be assumed to have a positive bias regard-
ing the usefulness of meditation and they are unlikely to be
representative of the general population regarding their personal-
ity and affective attitude towards meditation. Overcoming such
methodological difficulties requires extended training studies
with appropriate control groups and random assignment of par-
ticipants to meditation and control training (Green et al. 2014),
which renders research demanding and expensive.
Interestingly, however, recent studies suggest that meditation
can impact cognitive abilities without extended practice. Just like
for long-term effects, commonly from studies spanning weeks or
months, or more (Lippelt et al. 2014), these short-term effects
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(from studies spanning no more than 1–2 h) have been reported
for attentional selection, conflict monitoring, and creativity-
related tasks, and FAM and OMM were found to have opposite
effects.With regard to attentional selection, a single bout of FAM
was shown to induce a larger attentional blink than a single bout
of OMM (Colzato et al. 2015a). Given that this effect is likely to
reflect over-selectivity (i.e., the too-exclusive allocation of atten-
tional resources to the first of two to-be-reported targets: Olivers
and Nieuwenhuis 2005, 2006), this observation suggests that
FAM is more effective in promoting the focusing on a single
target than OMM is.
With respect to conflict monitoring, engaging in OMM
reduced the degree to which participants engaged in trial-to-
trial control adjustments, as compared to performance after
engaging in FAM (Colzato et al. 2015b). Control adjustments
are assumed to be reflected by the observation that effects of
stimulus-response compatibility (i.e., leakages of attention
that lead to response conflict) are reduced or even absent after
incompatible trials (Gratton et al. 1992). This reduction has
been attributed to increased focusing on the task goal
(Botvinick et al. 2001), which implies that focusing on this
goal is more effectively promoted by FAM than it is by OMM.
As for creativity, OMM, but not FAM, improves
brainstorming-like divergent thinking as assessed by the
Alternate Uses Task (Guilford 1967) in both experienced medi-
tation practitioners (Colzato et al. 2012b) and novices (Colzato
et al. 2017). FAM, but not OMM, tended to improve perfor-
mance in persistence-heavier convergent-thinking tasks like the
Remote Association Task (Mednick and Mednick 1967), but
these effects were weak and not replicable (Colzato et al.
2017). The most likely reason for that is that participants were
mainly university students, who arguably engage in convergent
thinking all day (at least when visiting the university), so that
interventions to improve that ability further are likely to be futile.
There is thus evidence that even briefly engaging in medita-
tive activity is sufficient to improve or impair performance in a
number of cognitive tasks, even in individuals that have no
previous experience with meditation. Given the brevity of the
meditational experience, we assume that these effects do not
reflect the acquisition of a particular skill but, rather, the estab-
lishment of a particular cognitive state. In the following, we
indeed suggest that, possible long-term effects notwithstanding,
engaging in FAM and OMM induces particular metacontrol
states, that is, states that moderate the way that individuals exert
cognitive control on lower-level processes. To motivate this sug-
gestion, we will first introduce the concept of a metacontrol state
and then apply this concept to meditation.
Cognitive Control
Modern functional theories of human cognition and behavior
commonly attribute psychological phenomena to the charac-
teristics of human information processing (Neisser 1967).
Stimulus information provided by the environment is assumed
to undergo perceptual analysis and attentional selection,
which might be followed by selecting and executing a partic-
ular action—as sketched in lowest level of Fig. 1. Various
weaknesses and shortcomings of the information-processing
metaphor (cf., Hommel et al. 2001) notwithstanding, function-
al theorists agree on the assumption that stimulus input un-
dergoes various processes before overt actions are issued.
However, they also agree on the insight that effective, contex-
tually adjusted performance requires the configuration of the
functional systems performing these cognitive processes to
the task at hand—an ability often referred to as cognitive
control or executive function (see the second, middle layer
of Fig. 1).
The concept of cognitive control can be seen as a more
mechanistic version of the outdated concept of will
(Goschke 2003), and it is fair to say that we currently know
considerably more about what cognitive control is doing than
about how it actually works (e.g., Monsell 2003). Interestingly
for our purposes, however, there is increasing evidence that
Fig. 1 Concept of a metacontrol
state
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control may not be exerted by a dedicated unitary system or
brain area, but that it rather emerges through the interplay of
multiple systems and areas. Of particular importance are con-
tributions of two dopaminergic pathways: the mesofrontal
pathway originating in the ventral tegmental area and the
nigrostriatal pathway originating in the substantia nigra
(Cools 2006). These two pathways are assumed to underlie
different and, to some degree, opposing cognitive control
functions: while the mesofrontal pathway seems to be impor-
tant for working memory and the representation and mainte-
nance of goals, the nigrostriatal pathway seems to play a key
role in inhibiting ongoing actions and taking in external infor-
mation (Cools 2006, 2008).
Goschke (2000) has suggested that the interplay if not
struggle between control systems with such opposing func-
tionalities might reflect and provide a solution for what he
calls the stability-flexibility dilemma that humans are facing.
On the one hand, effectively performing complex, temporally
extended actions requires some degree of stability of the un-
derlying goal and task set, which in turn calls for a consider-
able persistence of cognitive control. On the other hand, how-
ever, humans are living in a rapidly changing environment, so
that a planned or ongoing action may quickly turn out to be no
longer appropriate or unlikely to overcome unforeseen obsta-
cles. Too much persistence would thus not be adaptive.
Cognitive control would thus benefit from a system that keeps
monitoring environmental conditions to check whether the
requirements of the ongoing action are still given and whether
interesting alternatives are available. In case that the originally
intended action is no longer useful or less appropriate than
other available alternatives, this system could then stall the
ongoing action and facilitate the implementation of another
action goal. Hence, context-sensitive cognitive control may
emerge from the interaction between (systems promoting) per-
sistence and flexibility.
Metacontrol
The existence of multiple interacting systems that create cog-
nitive control as an emergent property raises the question of
how this interaction is controlled. The probably most intuitive
move would be to reinterpret this interaction in terms of the
well-established dual-route approach to decision-making and
action control, according to which choices emerge from the
struggle between will and habit or, in more modern terms,
between intentional and automatic routes (Bargh 1989). This
would suggest that the mesocortical persistence system would
rely on and represent the intention of the agent while the
nigrostriatal flexibility system would be driven by and repre-
sent stimulus information. If so, only one of the two routes or
systems would actually underlie cognitive control proper.
Converging evidence suggests another possible scenario
however. As discussed in more detail elsewhere (Hommel
2000, 2015), humans have control over the degree to which
the Bintentional^ and the Bautomatic^ route have impact on
their decisions. For instance, the Simon effect (better perfor-
mance if spatial responses correspond to task-irrelevant loca-
tion of a stimulus) is commonly assumed to reflect automatic
processing (for a review, see Hommel 2011), and it has in fact
been shown that presenting a lateralized stimulus creates a
lateralized readiness potential in the opposite hemisphere
(Eimer 1998). Interestingly, however, these signs of automa-
ticity disappear if the stimulus is presented before the relevant
stimulus-response mapping (Valle-Inclán and Redondo 1998),
suggesting that automaticity is contingent on the task goal
(Hommel 2010). Likewise, the size of the Simon effect is
drastically reduced, if not eliminated after stimulus-response
noncorresponding trials (Stürmer et al. 2002), suggesting that
automaticity is fully controlled (a prepared reflex in the sense
of Hommel 2000)—which obviously renders the term non-
sensical. Couching these observations in terms of persistence
and flexibility provides a more coherent picture. Let us con-
sider how a bias towards persistence or flexibility might affect
human decision-making. Figure 2 shows the core ingredients
of biologically plausible decision-making models (for a
review and critical evaluation, see Bogacz 2007). The leftmost
panel shows representations of two alternatives (1 and 2) com-
peting for a decision, as well as the two basic principles that
characterize human decision-making. First, it is competitive,
in the sense that the relative strength or activation of one
alternative determines its competitiveness and the degree to
which it suppresses (and eventually outcompetes) other alter-
natives—this is indicated by the two mutually inhibitory links
between the two alternatives. Second, decision-making is bi-
ased by goal representations, in the sense that more goal-
compatible alternatives receive more support and are thus
more likely to outcompete less goal-compatible alterna-
tives—this is indicated by the facilitatory arrow from the goal
representation that in the example supports alternative 1.
Let us now consider how a stronger bias towards persis-
tence would affect this scenario. As indicated in the top-right
panel, more persistence would be achieved by increasing the
top-down bias from the goal representation and/or the degree
of competition between alternatives (two possibilities that
have not yet been disentangled empirically; see Hommel
2015). Decision-making would become more selective, and
irrelevant (i.e., not goal-compatible) information would be
more effectively excluded. It is easy to see that this would,
among other things, reduce or eliminate the Simon effect,
suggesting that previous demonstrations that it can indeed be
eliminated are likely to reflect a strong bias towards persis-
tence. A strong bias towards flexibility would be achieved by
the exact opposite, namely, by reducing the top-down bias and
the degree of competition (see bottom-right panel), which in
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the most extreme case would lead to indecision. It is easy to
see that this would lead to a muchmore Bdemocratic^ decision
mode that provides more opportunities for irrelevant
information.
From a persistence-stability point of view, it is tempting to
replace the semantically and empirically unconvincing idea
that only one of the two players in decision-making is actually
controlled with a scenario according to which people actually
control both players by creating a particular balance between
persistence and flexibility. The control over this balance can
be considered the control of cognitive control, which is why
Hommel (2015) refers to it as metacontrol and the current
degree of persistence or flexibility as metacontrol state. Note
that this concept is agnostic with respect to the degree of
consciousness, awareness, or phenomenal experience that
may or may not go with particular metacontrol states (issues
emphasized by meta-awareness approaches; e.g., Chin and
Schooler 2010; Lutz et al. 2015) but only considers the func-
tional and neural characteristics of metacontrol states.
Interestingly, there is evidence that metacontrol states can be-
come chronified, resulting in default biases towards persis-
tence or flexibility, as a function of the individual genetic
profile (Markett et al. 2011) and cultural norms and values
(Masuda and Nisbett 2001). Even more important for our
purposes, there is also evidence for short-term priming, in
the sense that the current metacontrol state of individuals
can systematically be biased by experimental manipulations.
For instance, positive affect has been suspected to induce a
bias towards flexibility (Dreisbach and Goschke 2004), which
fits with the observation that inducing positive affect increases
the spontaneous eyeblink rate, a clinical indicator of the indi-
vidual dopamine level in the nigrostriatal pathway (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel 2012). If so, one would expect that
inducing positive mood improves performance in tasks that
rely on flexibility but impairs performance in tasks that rely on
persistence. Indeed, positive-mood induction increases brain-
storming performance as assessed by the Alternate Uses Task
and related creativity tests (Baas et al. 2008), but it also leads
to less systematic attentional focusing and greater distractibil-
ity in selective attention tasks (Dreisbach and Goschke 2004).
Inducing positive mood and presenting unexpected reward
have also been shown to reduce or even eliminate trial-to-
trial adjustments of top-down control (van Steenbergen et al.
2010), apparently by attenuating the response of the anterior
cingulate cortex (a system that is assumed to upregulate top-
down control in the presence of conflict: Botvinick et al. 2001)
Fig. 2 Core ingredients of
biologically plausible decision-
making models
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to stimulus-induced conflict (Botvinick et al. 2001). Negative
mood, in turn, has been reported to increase top-down control,
as in states of dysphoria induced by acute tryptophan deple-
tion in remitted depressed patients (Booij et al. 2005). Along
the same lines, inducing negative mood increases the
shielding of a prioritized task against competing tasks, as in-
dicated by a reduction of cross talk between tasks (Zwosta
et al. 2013). Taken altogether, there is systematic evidence that
positive-going mood drives metacontrol towards flexibility
and some evidence that negative-going mood promotes
persistence.
Given that the subjective experience of mood correlates
with, and presumably relies on the dopamine level of the
nigrostriatal pathway (Ashby et al. 1999), one may wonder
whether it is the conscious experience or, as our approach
would suggest, the underlying neurotransmitter activity that
is responsible for metacontrol biases. Preliminary evidence
suggests the latter: Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012)
reported that the mere performance of a task requiring persis-
tence or flexibility is sufficient to induce a corresponding
mood change; i.e., mood is improved when engaging in di-
vergent thinking but worsened when engaging in convergent
thinking. In other words, the mood experience does not seem
to be the cause but the result (or the conscious reflection) of
dopamine-regulated metacontrol biases.
Other manipulations were also successful in inducing
particular metacontrol biases. For instance, interleaving a
dual task with a persistence-heavy convergent-thinking
task has been found to reduce inter-task cross talk in the
former (Fischer and Hommel 2012). Social attention and
attitudes also seem to be sensitive to manipulations
targeting metacontrol. For instance, interleaving a joint
Simon task with a flexibility-heavy divergent-thinking task
increases the degree to which the actions of a co-agent are
considered when deciding about one’s own actions
(Colzato et al. 2013), and the same effect is obtained when
the joint Simon task is carried out after having encircled all
relational pronouns (as compared to all personal pronouns)
in a text (Colzato et al. 2012a). Performing in a divergent-
thinking task was also found to increase interpersonal trust
(Sellaro et al. 2014). Taken altogether, there is converging
evidence that various factors that suggest, promote, or re-
quire more persistence or more flexibility have a system-
atic effect on the way that other tasks are performed, in the
sense that biasing the system towards persistence improves
performance in persistence-heavy tasks but impairs perfor-
mance in flexibility-heavy tasks, while biasing the system
towards flexibility has the opposite effect. We take that to
imply that metacontrol states exist (as they seem to affect
other tasks than the one they were implemented for) and
that they are flexible to at least some degree—presumably
within constraints determined by the genetic setup and the
cultural background (Hommel 2015).
Meditation and Metacontrol
Now that we have introduced the concept of metacontrol
states, let us return to the question of how engaging in medi-
tation practices affects human cognition and performance. We
suggest that, first, engaging in meditation induces an immedi-
ate bias of the metacontrol state and that, second, different
meditation practices can induce biases that differ in direction.
Take FAM, which has the purpose to have the meditator focus
on one single item, one mental content at a time, and which
uses instructions serving that purpose. It makes sense to as-
sume that these instructions are effective in biasing the
metacontrol state of the meditator towards persistence which,
depending on the strength of the bias, is likely to improve the
meditator’s performance in tasks that require persistence but
not in tasks that require flexibility. Reversely, OMM has the
purpose to have the meditator process multiple items, multiple
mental contents in parallel, or at least close in time and thus
uses instructions achieving that. It makes sense to assume that
these instructions effectively bias the metacontrol state to-
wards flexibility, so that performance in flexibility-heavy
tasks, but not in persistence-heavy tasks, should benefit.
This emerging scenario fits well with the available find-
ings. For the attentional blink, it would predict a more pro-
nounced blink related to FAM than to OMM, or vice versa:
FAM-induced stronger persistence should further increase the
tendency to allocate attention to the first target, so that the
second is even more likely to be ignored, while OMM-
induced flexibility should have the opposite effect. This is
indeed what has been reported from both long-term and
short-term (see Lippelt et al. 2014, for a review) studies. For
conflict monitoring, one would expect that engaging in FAM
leads to more monitoring and top-down control adjustments
than engaging in OMM, which again fits with findings from
both long-term (Tang et al. 2007) and short-term (Colzato
et al. 2015b) studies. Finally, FAM would go better with top-
down guided convergent thinking while OMM should be
more compatible with associative brainstorming, which again
fits with both long-term (Lebuda et al. 2016) and short-term
(Colzato et al. 2012b, 2017) studies.
Taken altogether, we consider our metacontrol hypothesis a
useful tool to make sense of both short-term and long-term
effects of meditation and to generate directed predictions for
FAM-type and OMM-type meditation techniques. This is not
to say that our account represents an exhaustive theory of
meditation already, as a number of questions remain.
Open Questions
An important question of both theoretical and practical
relevance is how our considerations translate into existing
meditation techniques. FAM and OMM can be considered
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pure cases that in practice are often mixed and often in-
tentionally so—just think of Mindfulness-Based Stress
Reduction (MBSR), Mindfulness-Based Cognitive
Therapy (MBCT), and Insight (aka Vipassana) meditation.
Indeed, it is likely that focusing requires a mind state that
is more familiar to Western individuals than open moni-
toring, and it may be easier to understand how to Blet go^
top-down control (as required for OMM) after having en-
gaged in practicing FAM. This raises the question of how
to predict behavior for these mixed-type interventions. Our
approach suggests that it is the current state that matters,
irrespective of previous experience and previously adopted
mind state. But it is also conceivable that repeatedly en-
gaging in and switching between mind states that differ in
terms of persistence and flexibility promote some sort of
higher-order flexibility by allowing the individual to rap-
idly adopt the mind state that is most suitable for a given
situation. Looking into pure cases only, as in the studies
that we have discussed here, might lead one to overlook
this possibility.
For instance, in most studies that compared FAM and
OMM, one of the two techniques had a stronger effect than
the other, often with the other showing weak or no signifi-
cant effects. While some of these asymmetries might be due
to existing metacontrol biases in the investigated population
(e.g., university students), it would be more convincing if
such preexperimental biases could be objectively assessed
and predicted. Furthermore, while the observed effects fit
with our suggested scenario, one might wonder why other,
apparently similar effects have not been found. For instance,
Colzato et al. (2015b) observed an effect of meditation on
conflict monitoring in a Simon task, but the actual Simon
effect was not affected. Should an increase in persistence (or
flexibility) not reduce (increase) the processing of irrelevant
information and, thus, reduce (increase) the Simon effect?
One might argue that the Simon effect is too automatic to be
prevented online or too strong, or the impact of meditation
might be too mild to be visible in the data, but a better
mechanistic understanding of the underlying operations
seems necessary to back up such speculations. It is for these
reasons that we believe that our metacontrol hypothesis is a
step into the right direction, but that other steps need to
follow.
Acknowledgments This research was funded by anAdvanced Grant of
the European Research Council (ERC-2015-AdG-694722) to B.
Hommel.
References
Akbari Chermahini, S., & Hommel, B. (2012). Creative mood swings:
divergent and convergent thinking affect mood in opposite ways.
Psychological Research, 76, 634–640.
Ashby, F. G., Isen, A. M., & Turken, A. U. (1999). A neuropsychological
theory of positive affect and its influence on cognition.
Psychological Review, 106, 529–550.
Baas, M., de Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. (2008). A meta-analysis of
25 years of mood-creativity research: hedonic tone, activation, or
regulatory focus? Psychological Bulletin, 134(6), 779–806.
Bargh, J. A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: varieties of automatic in-
fluence on social perception and cognition. In J. Uleman & J. Bargh
(Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 3–51). New York: Guilford.
Bogacz, R. (2007). Optimal decision-making theories: linking neurobiol-
ogy with behavior. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 118–125.
Booij, L., Van der Does, A. W., Haffmans, P. J., Riedel, W. J., Fekkes,
D., & Blom, M. J. (2005). The effects of high-dose and low-dose
tryptophan depletion on mood and cognitive functions of remitted
depressed patients. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 19(3), 267–
275.
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J.
D. (2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological
Review, 108, 624–652.
Chiesa, A., & Seretti, A. (2009). Mindfulness-based stress reduction for
stress management in healthy people: a review and meta-analysis.
Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 15, 593–600.
Chin, J. M., & Schooler, J. W. (2010). Meta-awareness. Encyclopedia of
Consciousness, 2, 33–41.
Colzato, L. S., de Bruijn, E., & Hommel, B. (2012a). Up to Bme^ or up to
Bus^? The impact of self-construal priming on cognitive self-other
integration. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 341.
Colzato, L. S., Ozturk, A., & Hommel, B. (2012b). Meditate to create: the
impact of focused-attention and open-monitoring training on conver-
gent and divergent thinking. Frontiers in Psychology, 3(116), 1–5.
Colzato, L. S., van den Wildenberg, W., & Hommel, B. (2013).
Increasing self-other integration through divergent thinking.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20, 1011–1016.
Colzato, L. S., Sellaro, R., Samara, I., Baas, M., & Hommel, B. (2015a).
Meditation-induced states predict attentional control over time.
Consciousness and Cognition, 37, 57–62.
Colzato, L. S., Sellaro, R., Samara, I., & Hommel, B. (2015b).
Meditation-induced cognitive-control states regulate response-
conflict adaptation: evidence from trial-to-trial adjustments in the
Simon task. Consciousness and Cognition, 35, 110–114.
Colzato, L. S., Szapora, A., Lippelt, D., & Hommel, B. (2017). Prior med-
itation practice modulates performance and strategy use in
convergent- and divergent-thinking problems.Mindfulness, 8, 10–18.
Cools, R. (2006). Dopaminergic modulation of cognitive function: impli-
cation for L-DOPA therapy in Parkinson’s disease. Neuroscience &
Biobehavioral Review, 30(1), 1–34.
Cools, R. (2008). Role of dopamine in the motivational and cognitive
control of behaviour. The Neuroscientist, 14, 381–395.
Dreisbach, G., & Goschke, T. (2004). How positive affect modulates
cognitive control: Reduced perseveration at the cost of increased
distractibility. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 30, 343–353.
Eimer, M. (1998). The lateralized readiness potential as an on-line mea-
sure of central response activation processes. Behavior Research
Methods, Instruments, and Computers, 30, 146–156.
Fischer, R., & Hommel, B. (2012). Deep thinking increases task-set
shielding and reduces shifting flexibility in dual-task performance.
Cognition, 123, 303–307.
Goschke, T. (2000). Intentional reconfiguration and involuntary persis-
tence in task set switching. In S. Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.),
120 J Cogn Enhanc (2017) 1:115–121
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Attention and performance XVIII: Control of cognitive processes
(pp. 331–335). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goschke, T. (2003). Voluntary action and cognitive control from a cog-
nitive neuroscience perspective. In S. Maasen, W. Prinz, & G. Roth
(Eds.), Voluntary action: Brains, minds, and sociality (pp. 49–85).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G. H., & Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the use
of information: strategic control of activation of responses. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 121, 480–506.
Green, C. S., Strobach, T., & Schubert, T. (2014). On methodological
standards in training and transfer experiments. Psychological
Research, 78, 756–772.
Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Hommel, B. (2000). The prepared reflex: automaticity and control in
stimulus-response translation. In S. Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.),
Control of cognitive processes: attention and performance XVIII
(pp. 247–273). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hommel, B. (2010). Grounding attention in action control: the intentional
control of selection. In B. J. Bruya (Ed.), Effortless attention: a new
perspective in the cognitive science of attention and action (pp. 121–
140). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hommel, B. (2011). The Simon effect as tool and heuristic. Acta
Psychologica, 136, 189–202.
Hommel, B. (2015). Between persistence and flexibility: The Yin and
Yang of action control. In: A. J. Elliot (ed.), Advances in motivation
science, vol. 2 (pp. 33–67). New York: Elsevier.
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). The
theory of event coding (TEC): a framework for perception and ac-
tion planning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 849–937.
Lebuda, I., Zabelina, D. L., & Karwowski, M. (2016). Mind full of ideas:
a meta-analysis of the mindfulness–creativity link. Personality and
Individual Differences, 93, 22–26.
Lippelt, D. P., Hommel, B., & Colzato, L. S. (2014). Focused attention,
open monitoring and loving kindness meditation: effects on attention,
conflict monitoring and creativity. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1083.
Luk, C. (1994). The secrets of Chinese meditation. York Beach: Samuel
Weiser Inc..
Lutz, A., Slagter, H. A., Dunne, J. D., &Davidson, R. J. (2008). Attention
regulation and monitoring in meditation. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 12, 163–169.
Lutz, A., Jha, A. P., Dunne, J. D., & Saron, C. D. (2015). Investigating the
phenomenological and neurocognitive matrix of mindfulness-
related practices. American Psychologist, 70, 632–658.
Markett, S., Montag, C., Walter, N. T., Plieger, T., & Reuter, M. (2011).
On the molecular genetics of flexibility: the case of task-switching,
inhibitory control and genetic variants. Cognitive, Affective, &
Behavioral Neuroscience, 11, 644–651.
Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R. E. (2001). Attending holistically vs. analytical-
ly: comparing the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans.
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 81, 922–934.
Mednick, S. A., & Mednick, M. T. (1967). Examiner’s manual, remote
associates test: college and adult forms 1 and 2. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 134–
140.
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.
Olivers, C. N. L., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2005). The beneficial effect of
concurrent task-irrelevant mental activity on temporal attention.
Psychological Science, 16, 265–269.
Olivers, C. N. L., & Nieuwenhuis, S. (2006). The beneficial effects of
additional task load, positive affect, and instruction on the attention-
al blink. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 32, 364–379.
Sellaro, R., Hommel, B., deKwaadsteniet, E.W., &Colzato, L. S. (2014).
Increasing interpersonal trust through divergent thinking. Frontiers
in Psychology, 5, 561.
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P. H., & Hommel, B. (2010). In the mood
for adaptation: how affect regulates conflict-driven control.
Psychological Science, 21, 1629–1634.
Santucci, J. A. (1979). Transpersonal psychological observations on
Theravada Buddhist meditative practices. Journal of the
International Association for Buddhist Studies, 2/2, 66–78.
Stürmer, B., Leuthold, H., Schröter, H., Soetens, E., & Sommer, W.
(2002). Control over location-based response activation in the
Simon task: behavioral and electrophysiological evidence. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
28, 1345–1363.
Tang, Y. Y., Ma, Y., Wang, J., Fan, Y., Feng, S., Lu, Q., Yu, Q., Sui, D.,
Rothbart, M. K., Fan, M., & Posner, M. I. (2007). Short-term med-
itation training improves attention and self-regulation. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(43), 17152–17156.
Valle-Inclán, F., & Redondo, M. (1998). On the automaticity of ipsilateral
response activation in the Simon effect.Psychophysiology, 35, 366–371.
Zwosta, K., Hommel, B., Goschke, T., & Fischer, R. (2013). Mood states
determine the degree of task shielding in dual-task performance.
Cognition & Emotion, 27, 1142–1152.
J Cogn Enhanc (2017) 1:115–121 121
